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Abstract
Recent work on collective intertemporal choice suggests that non-dictatorial social preferences are gener-
ically time inconsistent. We argue that this claim conflates time consistency with two distinct properties of 
preferences: stationarity and time invariance. While time invariance and stationarity together imply time 
consistency, the converse does not hold. Although non-dictatorial social preferences cannot be stationary, 
they may be time consistent if time invariance is abandoned. If individuals are discounted utilitarians, re-
vealed preference provides no guidance on whether social preferences should be time consistent or time 
invariant. Nevertheless, we argue that time invariant social preferences are often normatively and descrip-
tively problematic.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
JEL classification: D60; D71; D90
Keywords: Collective decisions; Intertemporal choice; Time consistency
1. Introduction
Many important decisions in economic life require groups of people with heterogeneous time 
preferences to implement a collective consumption plan. Examples abound: families must de-
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to distribute profits between payouts to themselves and capital investments, communities with 
property rights over a natural resource must decide on an extraction plan, and resource rich 
countries must decide how to consume the proceeds from their sovereign wealth funds. In each 
of these examples an asset is held in common and is consumed dynamically over time, and the 
stake-holders in the decision very often have heterogeneous time preferences (Frederick et al., 
2002). How should such decisions be evaluated and made, given people’s different attitudes to 
time?
Recent theoretical and applied work (Jackson and Yariv, 2014, 2015; Adams et al., 2014) sug-
gests that any attempt to make such collective intertemporal choices in a non-dictatorial fashion 
is doomed to confront a time inconsistency problem (see also earlier observations by Marglin, 
1963; Feldstein, 1964; and Zuber, 2011). This paper argues that this finding is due to a conflation 
of time consistency with two a priori distinct properties of preferences: Stationarity and Time 
Invariance. Stationarity, introduced by Koopmans (1960), is an independence property of pref-
erences, while time invariance requires preferences over future consumption streams to be the 
same in each evaluation period (this does not rule out preference reversals – quasi-hyperbolic 
time preferences, for example, are time invariant). Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015), for example, 
show a necessary conflict between collective intertemporal choice and stationarity, but assume 
that social preferences must be time invariant. Yet while time invariance and stationarity to-
gether imply time consistency, the converse does not hold; time invariance is not required for 
time consistency. If the differences between these three properties of intertemporal preferences 
are made explicit it becomes clear that time consistent collective intertemporal choice is possi-
ble.
The differences between time consistent and time invariant social preferences are particu-
larly subtle when individuals’ preferences are discounted utilitarian, as is commonly assumed 
in the literature on the aggregation of time preferences. In this case, time consistency and time 
invariance are equivalent properties of individuals’ preferences1 (Halevy, 2015), but not of so-
cial preferences. We show that if individuals have heterogeneous discount factors, and social 
preferences are utilitarian and non-dictatorial, these preferences may be time consistent or time 
invariant, but not both. Since these properties are indistinguishable for discounted utilitarian indi-
viduals, but not for social preferences, the choice to impose one or the other property at the social 
level is ultimately a normative one – neither choice is more or less consistent with individuals’ 
preferences. We argue however that time invariance is likely to be a problematic feature of social 
preferences – both normatively and descriptively – for within-group intertemporal choice. Time 
invariance may however be more descriptively plausible for between-group choice, as might oc-
cur in intergenerational decision-making. We relate these observations to the empirical literature 
that seeks to test the time consistency of household behaviour, suggesting that the definition of 
time consistency it employs is too restrictive.
2. Time consistency, time invariance, and stationarity
To make our argument we begin by providing definitions of three distinct properties of 
intertemporal preferences: time consistency, time invariance, and stationarity. Once we have de-
fined these properties, it will immediately be clear that any two of them implies the third, as 
1 Discounted utilitarian preferences are also stationary.
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tency used by e.g. Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015); Adams et al. (2014) is in fact the conjunction 
of time invariance and stationarity. Time invariance and stationarity imply time consistency, but 
the converse does not hold.
We consider infinite consumption streams x = (xτ )τ∈N, where N is the set of non-negative 
integers, and xτ takes values in some set A. The set of all such streams is denoted C∞. Let hτ be 
a history of consumption at evaluation period τ ≥ 0, and define Hτ to be the set of all possible 
histories at τ . Thus hτ ∈ Hτ := {(x0, . . . , xτ−1)}, and we define H0 = ∅, where ∅ is the empty 
history. The set of all possible histories is denoted by H = ∪∞τ=0Hτ , with generic element h. 
A future consumption stream c at a history hτ is an infinite stream of future consumption values. 
Since the set of future consumption streams at any history hτ is isomorphic to the set of initial 
consumption streams C∞, we abuse notation slightly, and denote generic future consumption 
streams at any history hτ as c = (c0, c1, . . .) ∈ C∞, where ct denotes the consumption value 
realized t time steps in the future (i.e. at calendar time τ + t ).
Preferences are defined over future consumption streams c at each history h ∈ H . We assume 
a cardinal representation of preferences Vh(c), and distinguish the following three properties of 
preferences:
Definition 1.
(a) Time consistency: For all h ∈ H, a ∈ A, c, c′ ∈ C∞,
Vh((a, c)) ≥ Vh((a, c′)) ⇐⇒ V(h,a)(c) ≥ V(h,a)(c′) (1)
(b) Time invariance: For all h ∈ H, a ∈ A, c, c′ ∈ C∞,
Vh(c) ≥ Vh(c′) ⇐⇒ V(h,a)(c) ≥ V(h,a)(c′) (2)
(c) Stationarity: For all h ∈ H, a ∈ A, c, c′ ∈ C∞,
Vh((a, c)) ≥ Vh((a, c′)) ⇐⇒ Vh(c) ≥ Vh(c′) (3)
Time consistency is a consistency relationship between preferences at different histories. It 
rules out preference reversals, and implies that if an optimal plan is implemented today, it will 
remain optimal to follow it tomorrow. Time invariance also relates preferences at different histo-
ries, but is an altogether different property from time consistency. It requires that preferences be 
independent of translations of the time axis – shifting preferences forwards or backwards in time 
has no effect on rankings of future consumption streams. An immediate consequence of time 
invariance is that preferences are history independent.2 Finally, stationarity is an independence 
property of preferences at each fixed history. This property is at the heart of Koopmans’ (1960)
axiomatization of discounted utilitarian time preferences. Koopmans was clearly aware that sta-
tionarity is a separate property from time invariance, and also has no necessary implications for 
the time consistency of preferences:
2 Formally, preferences are history independent if for all times τ , all histories hτ , h′τ ∈ Hτ , and all future consumption 
streams c, c′, Vhτ (c) ≥ Vhτ (c′) ⇒ Vh′τ (c) ≥ Vh′τ (c′). All time invariant preferences are history independent, but not all 
history independent preferences are time invariant.
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to the ‘then’ future will be the same as that now applicable to the ‘present’ future. All postu-
lates are concerned with only one ordering, namely that guiding decisions to be taken in the 
present.” – Koopmans et al. (1964)
Halevy (2015) has observed in a simplified setting3 that any two of the three properties in 
Definition 1 implies the third. Inspection of the definitions shows that this observation holds in 
general.
To make a connection between these definitions and the definition of time consistency com-
monly deployed in the literature (see e.g. Jackson and Yariv, 2014, 2015; Adams et al., 2014) in 
the simplest possible way, suppose that preferences are time separable, i.e.
Vh(c) =
∞∑
t=0
Uht (ct ) (4)
where the sequence of utility functions {Uht (ct )} may be conditional on history h.4 Under this re-
striction, the definition of time consistency employed by these authors reduces to the conjunction 
of stationarity and time invariance.5
The crux of the argument in Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015) is a demonstration that non-
dictatorial social preferences cannot be stationary if individuals have heterogeneous discount 
factors. The proof of this finding does not require much more than an application of the classic re-
sults of Koopmans (1960). Koopmans showed that stationarity requires the following constraints 
on the sequences of utility functions {Uht (c)}:
Uht (c) = Uh(c)(βh)t (5)
3 Halevy (2015) only considers preferences over timed consumption. Our definitions allow for preferences over full 
consumption streams.
4 Separable preferences satisfy Koopmans’ independence axiom, an additional assumption in Jackson and Yariv’s 
(2015) definition of time consistency, which is in fact irrelevant to the question of time consistency in their case. Time 
consistency follows solely from the first of their stated conditions on preferences, i.e. the conjunction of stationarity 
and time invariance. Since the received wisdom in the literature, formalized by Jackson and Yariv (2015), is that non-
dictatorial social preferences are necessarily time inconsistent, we need only refute this claim for a subset of preferences 
to make our point. Hence we lose nothing by focussing on a separable preferences, which are the focus of the empirical 
work in Jackson and Yariv (2014); Adams et al. (2014).
5 Time invariance is implicit in the fact that the preferences Jackson and Yariv (2015) study do not carry an index that 
tells us the history of consumption, or the calendar time. Adams et al. (2014) make explicit reference to both station-
arity and time invariance in their definition. Jackson and Yariv (2015) go some way towards acknowledging the role of 
time invariance in their definition of time consistency. They describe their ‘stationarity’ property informally as follows: 
‘Stationarity, in the sense that rankings of consumption streams do not depend on when they occur’. This description 
emphasizes time invariance, but is not an accurate description of their stated ‘stationarity’ property, which is both sta-
tionarity (an independence property of preferences at a fixed history) and time invariance (a relation between preferences 
at different histories). In footnote 18 of their paper they go on to say that: “There is a large literature that...views an agent 
as [time] consistent whenever plans of action are not overturned over time. Whenever consumption streams are evaluated 
in the same way in each period (so that agents do not have dated utility functions), the concepts are similar.” What is not 
clear from this comment is how the main conclusion, i.e. the necessity of time inconsistency of collective intertemporal 
choice, relies critically on the time invariance property, and may be overturned if time invariance is abandoned. More-
over, even if individuals’ preferences are not dated, as would occur if they are discounted utilitarians, identifying time 
consistency with the conjunction of stationarity and time invariance leads to constraints on social preferences that are 
very different to those that follow from the definition in (1).
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only a single discount factor βh is permitted at each history h in this representation, it is a simple 
matter to show that any non-dictatorial social preference cannot be stationary if individuals have 
preferences of the form (5), but their discount factors βh are heterogeneous.6 This follows since 
any such social preference must reflect the heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences, which is 
not permitted by the stationary preferences (5).
To see why non-stationarity leads to a conflict with time consistency, note that we have already 
observed that:
(Time Consistency) AND (Time Invariance) ⇒ Stationarity.
Taking the contrapositive of this implication,
NOT Stationary ⇒ (NOT Time Invariant) OR (NOT Time Consistent).
Since non-dictatorial social preferences are not stationary, and the definition of time consistency 
in e.g. Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015) assumes time invariance, a conflict with time consistency 
occurs. However, as is clear from the above implication, an alternative possibility exists. If we 
abandon time invariance of social preferences, the possibility of time consistency remains open.
3. Time consistent utilitarian social preferences
To demonstrate that non-dictatorial social preferences can indeed be time consistent, we 
follow Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015) and assume that each individual i in a group G has 
discounted utilitarian time preferences:
V ih(c) =
∞∑
t=0
Ui(ct )(βi)
t (6)
These preferences are stationary and time invariant, and hence time consistent. It follows that 
revealed preference cannot disentangle time consistency and time invariance for discounted util-
itarian preferences.
While time consistency and time invariance are inseparable for discounted utilitarian agents, 
this is not the case for collective choices that are sensitive to the heterogeneity in agents’ pref-
erences, as we now demonstrate. We follow Jackson and Yariv (2014) and focus on utilitarian 
social preferences, and assume (without loss of generality, for our purposes) that consumption 
streams are common to all individuals. In addition, we assume that social preferences, like in-
dividuals’ preferences, are time separable. Thus, we define social preferences at any history hτ
as:
Whτ (c) =
∑
i∈G
wi(hτ )V
i
hτ
(c)
=
∑
i∈G
wi(hτ )
∞∑
t=0
Ui(ct )(βi)
t (7)
where wi(hτ ) is the weight assigned to individual i when the history of consumption at calendar 
time τ is hτ , and we assume that wi(hτ ) ≥ 0, ∑i∈G wi(hτ ) = 1 for all hτ .
6 See Proposition 1 in Jackson and Yariv (2015).
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time consistent/time invariant:
Proposition 1. Assume that there exist indices i, j such that wi(hτ ) > 0, wj(hτ ) > 0 for all 
hτ ∈ H , and βi = βj . Then
1. Social preferences (7) are time consistent if and only if the welfare weights wi(hτ ) are of 
the form:
wi(hτ ) = w
i
0(βi)
τ∑
j∈G w
j
0(βj )
τ
, (8)
where wi0 ≥ 0, 
∑
i∈G wi0 = 1.
2. Social preferences (7) are time invariant if and only if the welfare weights wi(hτ ) are of the 
form:
wi(hτ ) = yi, (9)
where yi ≥ 0, ∑i∈G yi = 1.
Proof. 1. The definition of time consistency in (1) requires
Whτ ((a, c)) ≥ Whτ ((a, c′)) ⇐⇒ W(hτ ,a)(c) ≥ W(hτ ,a)(c′) (10)
for any hτ , a, c, c′. Substituting (7) into the left hand side of (10), it becomes
∑
i
wi(hτ )U
i(a) +
∑
i
∞∑
t=0
wi(hτ )U
i(ct )(βi)
t+1
≥
∑
i
wi(hτ )U
i(a) +
∑
i
∞∑
t=0
wi(hτ )U
i(c′t )(βi)t+1
⇐⇒
∑
i
∞∑
t=0
[wi(hτ )βi]Ui(ct )(βi)t ≥
∑
i
∞∑
t=0
[wi(hτ )βi]Ui(c′t )(βi)t
The right hand side of (10) is equivalent to
∑
i
∞∑
t=0
wi((hτ , a))U
i(ct )(βi)
t ≥
∑
i
∞∑
t=0
wi((hτ , a))U
i(c′t )(βi)t
Comparing the expressions for the left and right hand sides of (10), we see that time consistency 
holds iff for all hτ ∈ H and a ∈ A,
wi((hτ , a)) ∝ βiwi(hτ ).
This can only occur if
wi(hτ ) = Kwi0(βi)τ
for some constants wi0, K > 0. Imposing the constraint 
∑
i∈G wi(hτ ) = 1 yields the result.
2. Since time invariance requires Whτ (c) to be independent of τ , the result follows. 
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for utilitarian social preferences. The welfare weights (8) violate time invariance since with this 
choice preferences over future consumption streams vary with the evaluation date τ . Although 
individual agents have time invariant preferences, social preferences behave as if there is a fixed 
origin of the time axis at τ = 0. Similarly, time invariant social preferences are not time consis-
tent, as the welfare weights (9) are not of the form (8). In this case social preferences can exhibit 
reversals with the passage of calendar time, even though individuals’ preferences cannot.
Observing that the conjunction of time consistency and time invariance implies stationarity, 
it is immediately clear from (5) that the only way it is possible to achieve both time consistency 
and time invariance in social preferences is if all individuals’ utilities are discounted with the
same discount factor β , and the welfare weights wi(τ) are independent of τ :
W˜hτ (c) =
∞∑
t=0
[
∑
i
w˜iU i(ct )]βt . (11)
This is the constraint on preferences used by Adams et al. (2014) in their empirical tests of the 
time consistency of observed choice behaviour. Proposition 1 shows that this is a substantially 
more stringent constraint than is required by time consistency. Time consistency does not rule 
out the possibility of social preferences reflecting the heterogeneity in individuals’ discount fac-
tors, provided that the welfare weights attached to individuals’ utilities evolve appropriately with 
calendar time.
We now make an observation that clarifies the possible interpretations of time consistent social 
preferences when agents have heterogeneous discount factors. The key point is that even if a 
discounted utilitarian agent’s preferences over future consumption streams are known, there are 
still multiple ways of defining her welfare (see also Caplin and Leahy, 2004). To see this the 
following definitions will be useful:
Definition 2. Consider a discounted utilitarian agent with preferences (6). Let Qτ be a measure 
of this agent’s welfare at time τ . We say that the agent is:
(a) Forward-looking if Qτ =∑∞t=τ U(ct )βt−τ for all τ
(b) Experiences lifetime utility if Qτ =
[∑τ−1
t=0 U(ct )βt
]
+ βτ [∑∞t=τ U(ct )βt−τ ] for all τ .
These two definitions of welfare are clearly equivalent from the perspective of the agent’s 
preferences over future consumption streams. The next result shows that the fact that agents’ 
welfare is underdetermined by their preferences has consequences for the interpretation of social 
preferences:
Lemma 1. If utilitarian social preferences are time consistent and non-dictatorial, the following 
interpretations of (7) are equivalent:
• Individuals have forward-looking welfare measures, and social preferences have τ -depen-
dent welfare weights (8).
• Individuals experience lifetime utility, and welfare weights are constant.
Proof. Suppose that individuals experience lifetime utility, and that the welfare weights wi(hτ )
are constant and equal to wi . Then social preferences at any calendar time τ are given by:0
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∑
i
wi0
τ−1∑
t=0
U(xt )(βi)
t +
∑
i
wi0
∞∑
t=0
U(ct )(βi)
t+τ (12)
where xt are values of consumption in the past, and ct are consumption values in the future. 
Since the xt cannot be changed and have no influence on preferences over future consumption 
streams, these preferences are equivalent to
Wτ(c) =
∑
i
wi0(βi)
τ
∞∑
t=0
U(ct )(βi)
t (13)
which are in turn equivalent to time consistent social preferences with welfare weights (8). 
The ambiguity in the interpretation of social preferences is a consequence of the fact that we 
cannot tell whether individuals with discounted utilitarian preferences (6) have forward-looking 
welfare measures, or experience lifetime utility. Both interpretations give rise to the same indi-
vidual rankings of future consumption streams, and are thus indistinguishable based on revealed 
preference. The lifetime utility interpretation of time consistent utilitarian preferences suggests 
that in any circumstance where cumulative outcomes over a period of time are seen as salient 
for the purposes of social comparisons, time consistency will be a compelling property, and time 
invariance may not.7
4. Time consistency or time invariance?
We have argued that there is no conflict between time consistency and non-dictatorial col-
lective intertemporal choice, provided that time invariance is abandoned. Should we nevertheless 
insist that social preferences be time invariant, thus ruling out the possibility of time consistency? 
Given that revealed preference cannot tell us which property to adopt if individual preferences 
are discounted utilitarian, how should we make this choice? In order to demonstrate what is at 
stake when choosing to model social preferences as time invariant it is helpful to consider the 
following stylized scenario:
Ada and Bertha are identical twins; both are childless, single, and have identical wealth. On 
their 60th birthday they receive news that a distant cousin they’ve never met has died, and they 
will inherit his fortune. Their cousin died intestate, so there is no will to specify how the bequest 
should be divided between them. Ada is naturally impatient, while Bertha is patient. How should 
a utilitarian social planner allocate the bequest between them?
Suppose that the planner is time consistent. In this case first best intertemporal allocations can 
be decentralized by establishing property rights over the bequest, and then allowing each sister 
to consume her share as she pleases. Suppose that the planner’s ethics dictate that an equal share 
of the bequest be given to each sister. The planner makes this allocation, and walks away happy 
in the knowledge that she need never revisit this decision.
7 Similarly to Lemma 1, if social preferences are time invariant the following interpretations of (7) are equivalent:
• Individuals have forward-looking welfare measures, and social preferences have constant welfare weights (9).
• Individuals experience lifetime utility, and social preferences have τ -dependent welfare weights, wi(τ) ∝ yi (βi )−τ .
We focus on the time consistent case, as the lifetime utility interpretation is more natural in this case.
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shares to the sisters, before departing on other business, never intending to return. To her surprise 
however, the planner is asked to revisit the sisters 10 years later and assess their well-being. Ada 
has led a wild life in the intervening decade, consuming her inheritance much faster than Bertha. 
But the planner asks herself: what has changed since the sisters were 60? Although Ada has 
had a better life than Bertha, this is in the past and can’t be changed. Since the circumstances 
are the same, except that the sisters happen to be 10 years older, the planner seizes some of 
Bertha’s carefully saved cash, and reallocates it to Ada, so that their holdings of what remains 
of the bequest are again equal. Ada immediately spends her new wealth on fast cars and fancy 
footwear, while Bertha continues to put something away for a rainy day.
We believe that most people would intuitively feel that Ada should be made to take responsi-
bility for her past excesses, and Bertha should not be penalized for her frugality in this scenario. 
Thus, many would believe that social preferences should be time consistent, not time invariant, 
in this case. A non-paternalistic reason for this could be that individuals experience ‘memory 
utility’ from past consumption (see e.g. Strotz, 1955; Caplin and Leahy, 2004), as suggested by 
the lifetime utility interpretation of time consistent social preferences in Lemma 1. Although 
individuals are not able to express this backward looking aspect of preferences directly through 
their choices, a social planner would be doing them a disservice if she neglected this for the pur-
poses of social welfare computations. A purely normative reason for this could be that there is an 
evaluation date τ = 0 that is ethically salient, even if individuals are in fact exclusively forward 
looking. In our scenario, the date of the initial bequest stands out as a natural ‘origin’ of the time 
axis. Many people would feel that cumulative utility from the date of the bequest onwards is 
ethically relevant to the task of apportioning the bequest.
Are there situations where time invariance might seem a more appropriate assumption than 
time consistency? We believe that modeling social preferences as time invariant might be more 
plausible if we are attempting to describe conflicts between successive groups of different people, 
as might occur in e.g. intergenerational decision-making. To illustrate, consider the following 
example:
A nation discovers an enormous oil deposit in its territorial waters. The deposit is large enough 
to generate rents for generations to come, which will be invested in public goods that benefit all 
citizens equally. Citizens are born in different time periods, and have finite lives.8 Suppose that 
each citizen is either Avaricious (i.e. favours a high intergenerational discount rate), or Benevo-
lent (i.e. favours a low intergenerational discount rate). In each period the currently living citizens 
must decide how much oil to extract. How is this likely to be done?
A ‘pure’ normative approach to this problem would require the construction of a social welfare 
function that aggregates the lifetime utilities of all individuals born in any time period, past, 
present, or future. To illustrate this procedure, define an indicator function:
i,s(τ ) =
{
1 if individual i born at time s is alive at time τ
0 otherwise
Using this definition, and letting yi(s) > 0 be the welfare weight on individual i born in period 
s, such a normative welfare function might take the following form:
8 Technically, the properties of stationarity and time invariance are only defined for infinite consumption streams, i.e. 
if agents are infinitely lived. Time consistency is however meaningful for finitely lived agents, and all three properties are 
meaningful for the social preferences (14) we define below. See Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) for a model in which agents 
have finite, but uncertain, lifetimes, which de facto induces preferences over infinite consumption streams.
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τ−1∑
s=0
∑
i∈G
yi(s)
( ∞∑
t=0
U˜ i(ct )(δi)
t+τ−si,s(τ + t)
)
+
∞∑
s=τ
∑
i∈G
yi(s)
( ∞∑
t=0
U˜ i(cs−τ+t )(δi)ti,s(s + t)
)
(14)
The first term in this expression captures the remaining lifetime utilities of individuals born at 
times s < τ who are still alive in the current evaluation period τ . The second term captures the 
lifetime utilities of those who are born at times s ≥ τ . Agents’ views on the appropriate degree 
of social altruism towards future generations are irrelevant for the purposes of constructing the 
social welfare function (14), and may be discarded.9 The discount factors δi that appear in this 
expression are agents’ private discount factors on their own utilities U˜ i(c), and have no nec-
essary relationship to the social welfare weights yi(s), which are purely normative quantities. 
Social preferences constructed in this manner will be time consistent, as follows from an adap-
tation of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 to this overlapping lifetimes setting. While this procedure 
yields a normative social preference relation that does not conflict with time consistency, from a 
descriptive perspective it makes strong demands on current living agents. In particular, the cur-
rent generation is required to discard their own views on how much importance to give to future 
generations when deciding on their extraction policy.
What seems more likely to occur from a descriptive perspective is that the agents currently 
alive will decide how much oil to extract through a collective decision-making process that trades 
off the different degrees of altruism expressed by current individuals. If this process is efficient 
the preferences of generation τ may be represented by a welfare function of the form:
Whτ (c) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
i∈G
wiUi(ct )β
t
i , (15)
where wi is the weight given to agent i’s opinion. The interpretation of the inputs to this welfare 
function is entirely different to that in (14). Here the utility functions Ui(c) reflect i’s opinion 
about social utility, rather than her private utility, and the discount factors βi reflect her opinion 
on the appropriate degree of intertemporal social impatience. Since the decision-making process 
that determines current extraction will unfold in each generation, time invariance seems a rea-
sonable property to impose if we are attempting to model the conflict between the preferences of 
successive groups of decision-makers.10
The crucial difference between the ‘twins’ and ‘oil’ scenarios we have sketched is that in 
the case of the twins we were concerned with intertemporal distribution within a fixed group 
of people over time, whereas in the oil case we were concerned with intertemporal distribution 
between different groups of people. In the former case all agents who are affected by a decision 
are present at all points of time, whereas in the latter only a subset of agents affected by a decision 
are present at each point in time. Time consistency seems a much more plausible descriptive 
property of social preferences than time invariance in the former case, since the ahistorical nature 
of time invariant preferences would be seen as deeply unfair by current agents. In the case of 
between-group choice however, although time invariance may do violence to the preferences of 
9 Note however that this is a paternalistic move if individuals experience anticipatory utility from the wellbeing they 
expect their descendants to achieve.
10 Note that the composition of successive groups must be stable if the preferences (15) are to be time invariant.
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As a descriptive matter, it seems more likely that the interests of past and future groups are 
only relevant insofar as current decision-makers account for them. To our minds this makes 
time invariance a more plausible descriptive modeling assumption in this case. Of course, this 
argument makes no claims about the normative status of time invariance as a property of social 
welfare criteria.
5. Implications for the empirical literature
While we find time invariance to be a not implausible descriptive property in between-group 
choice, the empirical literature focusses exclusively on within-group choice. Our hypothesis that 
time consistent, but non-invariant, social preferences are likely to prevail in this case receives 
support from the innovative study of household consumption behaviour in Adams et al. (2014). 
Although they strongly reject the hypothesis that household behaviour can be described by time 
invariant and time consistent preferences of the form (11), they find considerable support for 
the hypothesis that household consumption behaviour can be rationalized by time consistent 
social preferences with time varying welfare weights (8). Adams et al. (2014) refer to this as the 
‘full efficiency’ model, and claim that this identifies individual discount rate heterogeneity as a 
source of household time inconsistency. Yet the appropriate interpretation of these findings is that 
collective choices can often be rationalized by a time consistent utilitarian model, provided that 
household preferences account for the cumulative lifetime utility experienced by each household 
member.
In related work, Jackson and Yariv (2014) study a laboratory simulation of collective intertem-
poral choice in which subjects are asked to choose between collective consumption allocations 
on behalf of a group of individuals with heterogeneous, exogenously imposed, discount factors. 
They elicit preferences over pairs of collective consumption streams such as
C = (105,0,0) C′ = (0,160,0)
C′′ = (0,105,0) C′′′ = (0,0,160).
Stationarity requires the planner’s preferences to obey C  C′ ⇐⇒ C′′  C′′′. Jackson and 
Yariv (2014) observe almost unanimous violation of this property, leading them to conclude that 
their subjects’ collective preferences are time inconsistent. Yet these choice tasks provide little 
information about the time consistency of planners’ preferences. As (1) makes clear, a test of time 
consistency requires the construction of dynamic choice tasks, in which subject planners choose 
between a pair of collective consumption streams, the group is given the first period outcome of 
the planner’s preferred stream, and the planner is then asked to choose between the continuations 
of the initial consumption streams.11 No such dynamic choice tasks were considered in the Jack-
son and Yariv (2014) study – subjects always made once-off choices between fixed consumption 
streams. All we can say for sure is that the study provides strong evidence against stationarity, as 
should be expected when planners attempt to account for the heterogeneous preferences of group 
members.
11 See Halevy (2015) for an experimental design that allows time consistency, time invariance, and stationarity to be 
disentangled.
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